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NOTE
Rule 305: Expanded Criminal Discovery
I. Introduction
By promulgating Rule of Criminal Procedure 305,' the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court at last addressed the serious problems of criminal dis-
covery. The new rule rectifies the glaring inadequacies of rule 310,2
which in various instances failed to satisfy the demands of due process ,3
and establishes a more liberal discovery procedure that should eliminate
the treatment of criminal trials as "sporting events" in which each side
has secret plays.4 This liberal approach to discovery contrasts sharply
with the common-law policy that completely prohibited pretrial ex-
changes of information. 5 Although Supreme Court interpretations of the
Constitution had relaxed this common-law prohibition, the minimal
constitutional requirements provided no clear standards for determining
when discovery was proper.
6
It is evident that due process demands prosecutorial disclosure of
evidence favorable to the defendant. In Brady v. Maryland7 the United
States Supreme Court declared that "suppression by the prosecutor of
I. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305.
2. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 320 A.2d 134
(1974). In Shiomos, the court unanimously expressed support for more liberal discovery
procedures, but was nevertheless constrained by the "exceptional circumstances" require-
ment in rule 310 to deny disclosure of the results of medical examinations of alleged rape
victims. Id. at 110, 320 A.2d at 137; id. at 111, 320 A.2d at 137 (Pomeroy, J., concurring); id.
at 112, 320 A.2d at 138 (Nix, J., concurring); id. at 112, 320 A.2d at 138 (Manderino, J.,
dissenting). See also Zimmerman, Annual Survey of Pennsylvania Legal Developments-
Part l--Criminal Law, 47 PA. B.A.Q. 88, 90 (1976).
3. Due process requires disclosure of all evidence favorable to the accused. See
notes 7-11 and accompanying text infra. Rule 310, however, was adopted before this
requirement reached constitutional stature and fails to address the "favorable" evidence
situation. If such information is withheld until trial commences, it is possible that defense
may be effectively denied the opportunity to make use of the "favorable" material.
4. The Patriot, Jan. 9, 1978, at I, col. 2 (remarks of Dauphin County District
Attorney LeRoy S. Zimmerman); ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 1.2, Comment at 34-40 (Approved Draft 1970)
[hereinafter cited as ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS].
5. See Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 114 A.2d 334 (1955); Annot., 7 A.L.R.
3d 8 (1966). The common-law prohibition of discovery has been mitigated by rule of court,
see, e.g., N.J.R.R. 3:13-3 and the continually developing common-law, see, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d 894 (1963) (exceptional circumstances may require
some pretrial discovery).
6. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 1.2, Comment at 40-42.
7. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. '8 The Brady decision, how-
ever, raises more questions than it can successfully answer. First, when is
evidence "favorable" to the accused?9 Second, must this favorable
evidence be admissible to be discoverable? 1" Last, must discovery of this
favorable evidence be permitted before the trial has commenced? l
Except for the uncertain requirement of prosecutorial disclosure of
evidence favorable to the accused, due process interferes no further with
the common-law prohibition of criminal discovery.12 Thus, rule 310 left
the defendant to the whims of the trial judge who, at his discretion, could
permit or deny pretrial discovery.' 3 At the very least, rule 305 removes
much of the unguided discretion and uncertainty that existed under rule
310 and judicial interpretations of the due process clause. Notwithstand-
ing this achievement, any rule that expands criminal discovery is subject
to at least three major criticisms. 14
II. Expanded Pretrial Discovery: Arguments Pro and Con
The most convincing argument that can be propounded against the
supreme court's adoption of rule 305 focuses on the dangers of expanded
pretrial discovery, 15 which include the following: (1) the defendant may
perjure himself by conforming his story to the prosecution's evidence; (2)
the defendant's cohorts may intimidate prospective prosecution witnes-
ses; and (3) the effectiveness of undercover agents and the success of
related investigations may be destroyed. 16 These problems arise, how-
8. id. at 87.
9. Compare Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) with
id. at 116-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. The due process clause, according to two judicial interpretations, does not require
the pretrial disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused. United States v. Leighton, 265
F. Supp. 27, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Traenkner, 314 A.2d 202, 206-07 (Del. Super. Ct.
1973). Due process does require, however, that the prosecutor disclose favorable evidence
when it is still possible for the defense to make use of it. United States v. Johnson, 298 F.
Supp. 58, 65 (N.D. Ii. 1969). In some cases, therefore, pretrial disclosure of favorable
evidence may be constitutionally necessary.
[l]f disclosure of some types of exculpatory evidence were delayed until trial it
would not be early enough to enable defendants to make effective use of it, and in
this situation it is likely that the late disclosure would violate due process.
United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186, 193 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
12. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that denials of pretrial discovery are
not deprivations of due process. Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 265, 365 A.2d 140,
143 (1976); Commonwealth v. Turra, 442 Pa. 192, 275 A.2d 96 (1971).
13. "The extensive use of pretrial discovery in civil cases could not be extended to
criminal cases. [Rule 310] therefore permits the discretionary grant of discovery to the
defendant in the narrow area of the defendant's own confession or written statements. " PA.
R. Crim. P. 310, Comment (emphasis in original) Commonwealth v. Hamm, - Pa. -, 378
A.2d 1219 (1976).
14. See notes 15-23 and accompanying text infra.
15. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953); Commonwealth v.
.Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 566, 192 A.2d 894, 895 (1963).
16. Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal Rules?, 21 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 15
(1964).
ever, in the relatively few cases involving organized crime. Thus, excep-
tions to expanded rules of discovery can be fashioned to meet the dangers
of perjury, witness intimidation, and loss of undercover agents when they
become realistic concerns.
17
A second argument against expanded pretrial discovery is that it
gives the defendant an unfair advantage. Since the district attorney must
sustain a heavy burden of proof and since the accused's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination can be exercised to limit discovery in
favor of the prosecution, it has been argued that mutuality of exchange,
which makes civil discovery so beneficial, does not exist in the criminal
arena.' 8 The defendant's "unfair" advantage, however, is more apparent
than real. Unlike the accused, the government has superior investigative
abilities that provide the prosecution with an abundance of information
about the crime. 19 Moreover, the prosecutor's heavy burden of proof is
designed to prevent wrongful convictions and not to grant the accused
unfair advantages.2°
The final criticism of expanded pretrial discovery is that it will
destroy the adversary system. 2 1 It might be contended that prosecutors
will cease to document cases while defense attorneys rely totally on
government investigations. It is equally possible, however, that full and
free discovery will help the procedural system reach its goal of fair,
expeditious, and final disposition of cases on their merits. 22 Liberal
discovery should reduce the number of requests for continuances and may
even reduce the number of cases going to trial .23
III. The Reality of Rule 305: General and Specific Provisions
The supreme court's promulgation of rule 305 renders academic the
arguments posited against expanded pretrial discovery. In sharp contrast
to the presumption of rule 310 that discovery should ordinarily be de-
17. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, note 4 supra, § 1.2, Comment at 34-42. See also id.
at § 2.6.
18. In United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), Judge Learned Hand
uttered the classic diatribe against criminal discovery.
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecu-
tor is held rigidly to his charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his
defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be
convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick
over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to
see.
Id. at 649.
19. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Proce-
dure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1185 (1960).
20. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 291.
21. Louisell, Criminal discovery: Dilemma real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56,
58 (1961).
22. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, note 4 supra, § 1.2, Comment at 40-42.
23. Id.
nied, 24 rule 305 actually encourages informal discovery. 25 The new rule
incorporates ABA guidelines to aid the trial court in determining what is
discoverable 26 and even provides for mandatory disclosure. 27 The most
important aspect of rule 305, however, is its enumeration of specific
categories for regulating discovery. 28
A. Evidence Favorable to the Accused
Rule 305 remedies some of the uncertainities in the Brady29 require-
ment that prosecutors disclose evidence favorable to the accused by
mandating pretrial disclosure of "any evidence favorable to the accused
which is material either to guilt or punishment, and which is within the
possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth."30 Thus,
absent a protective order, 3 1 favorable evidence must be disclosed before
trial commences if the information is "material" 32 and within the prose-
cutor's "possession or control."-
33
B. Defendant's Statements or Confessions
Pennsylvania law has long recognized the importance of permitting a
defendant to examine his alleged confession.
3 4
[Tjhere seems to be a measure of elemental justice in permitting
one accused of crime to see a confession alleged to have been
made by him, which he expects to be produced against him at
his trial. Confessions are not always written exactly as they are
made, nor is the most meticulous care always displayed by the
police authorites in obtaining and transcribing them.
35
24. See note 13 supra.
25. See PA. R. CtuM. P. 305A (discovery motion may not be made unless a good faith
effort has been made to resolve all questions of discovery and to provide information
required or requested under the rules).
26. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, note 4 supra, §§ 2.1, 2.2; PA. R. CRIM. P. 305,
Comment.
27. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l) (mandatory disclosure by Commonwealth); PA. R. CRIM.
P. 305C(l) (mandatory disclosure by defendant).
28. Rule 310 provided for only the discretionary grant of discovery of defendant's
written statements and confessions. It completely prohibited the disclosure of statements by
prosecution witnesses. No other discovery could be obtained unless the defendant could
show "exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons."
29. See notes 7-11 and accompanying text supra.
30. PA. R. CRim. P. 305B(l)(b).
31. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305F. See notes 130-31 and accompanying text infra.
32. For a discussion of the materiality standard, see notes 117-29 and accompanying
text infra.
33. The requirement in PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l)(b) that exculpatory evidence be
disclosed if "within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth" ison
its face narrower than the demand of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 that favorable information be
provided if in the "possession, custody, or control" of the government. The federal rule has
been interpreted to impose a duty of disclosure "not only [on] the prosecutor, but [on] the
Government as a whole, including its investigative agencies." United States v. Bryant, 439
F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (opinion of Judge J. Skelly Wright); accord, ABA DISCOVERY
STANDARDS, note 4, supra § 2.1(d). A narrow construction of the term "possession or
control" is antithetical to the policies underlying rule 305. See State v. Humphrey, 217 Kan.
352, 537 P.2d 155 (1975).
34. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hoban, 54 Lack. 213 (Pa. 1952). Unfortunately, the
supreme court's decision in Hoban is not officially reported.
35. Id. at 218.
The purposes of liberal discovery of a defendant's statements are to give
the defense an opportunity to correct errors in transcription,3 6 determine
voluntariness and admissibility of the statement, 37 evaluate the conse-
quences of having the accused testify, and make informed decisions about
the disposition of the case.
38
Under rule 310, however, the trial court could, in its discretion,
deny a defendant's request to examine his own written or recorded
statements.3 9 Moreover, an accused who failed to demonstrate "excep-
tional circumstances and compelling reasons" would be denied disclo-
sure of written summaries of his oral statements. 4° This created a
loophole that permitted the Commonwealth to evade discovery by sum-
marizing rather than transcribing an accused's oral statements.41 Rule 305
remedies this situation by requiring disclosure of "the substance of any
oral confession or inculpatory statement, and the identity of the person to
whom the confession or inculpatory statements was made," 42 as well as
written or recorded statements.
C. Prior Criminal Records
As is the case with disclosure of a defendant's statements, pretrial
inspection of an accused's prior criminal record supplements his
counsel's information, assures the record's accuracy, and advises counsel
of the possible consequences of placing the defendant on the stand. 4
Notwithstanding these advantages, rule 310 precluded pretrial discovery
of a defendant's prior criminal record unless the accused established
"exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons." Since an accused
should be aware of his previous convictions, the exceptional circum-
stances requirement was understandably difficult to satisfy.
Rule 305, in contrast, compels the disclosure of a defendant's prior
record." It does not state, however, whether the accused is entitled to
pretrial inspection of the criminal records of prosecution witnesses.45
36. State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 76-77, 51 A.2d 647, 653 (1947).
37. Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 806, 91 Cal. Rptr. 549, 599, 478 P.2d 26, 30
(1970).
38. United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
39. Commonwealth v. Nardi, 430 Pa. 88, 92, 242 A.2d 248, 250 (1968). But cf.
Commonwealth v. Hill, 466 Pa. 442, 444, 353 A.2d 436,437 (1976) (when defendant seeks to
suppress his confession because of delay between arrest and arraignment, he is entitled to
discover the confession to establish his claim).
40. Commonwealth v. Crawford, 461 Pa. 60, 336 A.2d 275 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 329 A.2d 258 (1974); Commonwealth v. Turra, 442 Pa. 192, 275 A.2d 96
(1971).
41. A similar loophole existed in FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 before the 1974 amendments.
United States v. Morrison, 43 F.R.D. 516, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
42. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l)(b). There is a danger that a defendant might encourage
reprisals against the informant, but this potential harm can be prevented through the device
of a protective order. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 305F.
43. United States v. Leichtfuss, 331 F. Supp. 723, 735 (N.D. I1. 1971) (construing a
local rule permitting disclosure of defendant's criminal record).
44. PA. R. CRlM. P. 305B(1)(c).
45. Other jurisdictions require disclosure of the criminal records of prosecution wit-
nesses as necessary for fairness. Engstrom v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 240, 244, 97
Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (1971); State v. Criwford, 257 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1972).
Guidance, on this question is probably omitted because such information
is available under Pennsylvania's Right to Know Act.46
D. Identification Proceedings
According to the Supreme Court's determinations in the Wade
trilogy,' 7 the right to counsel attaches during all pretrial identification
proceedings. 48 The Court imposed this requirement to reduce the number
of misidentifications resulting from unfair pretrial confrontations and to
assure meaningful cross-examination of eyewitnesses during trial.
49 Vio-
lation of this right to counsel will result in the exclusion of any subse-
quent in-court identifications unless the prosecution establishes "by clear
and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon
observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification.-5
0
This heavy burden of proof is lightened considerably when the
defense is denied discovery of the circumstances surrounding an allegedly
unfair pretrial confrontation.5" Rule 305, however, compels the pretrial
disclosure of "the circumstances and results of any identification of the
defendant by voice, photograph, or in-person identification .... -52
Moreover, since the discovery requirement extends to all identification
proceedings, its application will supplement the information that a de-
fense attorney can obtain when present during a pretrial confrontation.
53
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
47. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Accord, Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa.
205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970).
48. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967).
49. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
50. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967) (emphasis added). To determine
whether an in-court identification is legally independent of an impermissibly tainted pretrial
confrontation, the Court provided examples of various elements that may be considered:
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any
discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual de-
scription, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by
picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a
prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification.
Id. at 241.
51. It is unclear whether counsel's absence during a pretrial lineup constitutes a
sufficient showing of "exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons" to warrant a
discovery order under former rule 310. It is clear, however, that even if the requisite
showing of exceptional circumstances were made, a discovery order under rule 310 would
still be discretionary.
52. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l)(d). The comment following rule 305 notes that identifica-
tion refers to "all forms of identifying a defendant by means of the defendant's person being
in some way exhibited to a witness for the purpose of an identification." Although intended
to be explanatory, this definition is narrower than that expressed in the text of the rule,
which provides for disclosure of voice and photograph identifications as well as lineups and
showups.
53. Presence at a lineup does not reveal all the circumstances that would aid in
challenging the identification such as the witness' opportunity to observe the criminal actor
and whether he had identified any other suspects. See generally note 50 supra.
E. Electronic Surveillance
Pennsylvania severely restricts electronic surveillance. 5 4 Law en-
forcement officers may resort to this device only when a judge determines
that "there is probable cause that a crime has been, is being or is about to
be committed and . . the personal safety of law enforcement officers
. . . may be in jeopardy." 55 Even in those limited situations in which
police officers may electronically record conversations, the recording
itself is inadmissible.
5 6
Given these severe restrictions on the use of electronic surveillance,
it is apparent that discovery of this type of information could not easily be
obtained under rule 310. Since the recording itself is inadmissible, it is
unlikely that a defendant could establish the "exceptional circumstances
and compelling reasons" necessary for disclosure. It is even more unlike-
ly that an accused who is uncertain of the duration or even existence of
electronic surveillance could make a discovery request with the required
specificity. 57 Even assuming that a defendant could establish the neces-
sary specificity and "extraordinary circumstances," a trial court would
still be justified in exercising its discretion to deny disclosure on several
bases:
[I]f it is demonstrated to the court that there are recorded
conversations of innocent persons or persons wholly uncon-
nected with the suspected criminal activities which have minim-
al evidential worth and their revelation might be unduly embar-
assing or humiliating, these may be withheld for disclosure.
Similarly, there may be conversations the disclosure of which
may create a risk of special danger or harm to persons. There
may be conversations concerning other criminal activities
which may be the subject of pending investigations. Some
conversations might be privileged or otherwise confidential.
Certain communications might tend to disclose the identity of
informants or the nature or techniques of police investigative
procedures. Such examples can be multiplied.5 8
The operation of the trial court's discretion as a barrier to discovery,
however, has been eliminated by adoption of rule 305. 5 9
If they are "material to the instant case," 6 rule 305 mandates the
release of "the transcripts and recordings of any electronic surveillance,
and the authority by which the said transcripts and recordings were
54. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-05 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
55. Id. § 5705(d)(3).
56. Id. § 5705(c)(3).
57. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 136, 324 A.2d 441, 444
(1974).
58. State v. Braeunig, 122 N.J. Super. 319, 330, 300 A.2d 346, 351 (App. Div. 1973).
59. This does not mean, however, that the trial court is powerless to deny requests for
the products of electronic surveillance that include the identity of informants, reveal police
investigative procedures, or disclose the subject matter of pending investigations. In these
situations the district attorney can apply to the court for a protective order under rule 305F.
See notes 130-31 and accompanying text infra.
60. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1). See notes 118-25 and accompanying text infra.
obtained."- 61 But since electronic recordings are inadmissible at trial ,62
can they ever be considered "material to the instant case"? Since mate-
rial evidence is very often inadmissible, 63 refusal to release electronic
records simply because of their inadmissibility would be improper.
Nevertheless, it is unclear what makes a requested item of discovery
"material to the instant case."64
F Witness Discovery
1. Identity of Prosecution Witnesses. -In Commonwealth v. Jack-
son ,61 the superior court acknowledged the advantages of pretrial disclo-
sure of the identities of prosecution witnesses. "If the Court makes the
names and addresses of witnesses available to defense counsel, it would
facilitate plea bargaining. Moreover, the defense counsel's ability to
effectively cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and test their credi-
bility would be enhanced."66 Nevertheless, the court denied disclosure of
a list of prosecution witnesses because the Pennsylvania Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure contained no such requirement.67
The supreme court's adoption of rule 305, which permits discretion-
ary disclosure of the names and addresses of eyewitnesses, remedies this
unfortunate situation. 68 Before the trial court may exercise its discretion,
however, defense counsel must establish that a list of eyewitnesses is
"material to the preparation of the defense" and that the request for such
a list is reasonable.69 If defense counsel seeks discovery of the identities
of other prosecution witnesses, he must also demonstrate that such disclo-
sure "would be in the interests of justice.
' 70
61. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(g).
62. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
63. See generally 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 151-264 (13th ed.
1972).
64. See notes 118-25 and accompanying text infra. The product of electronic surveill-
ance might be deemed material if it provides defense counsel with the information necessary
for a suppression motion. According to the Supreme Court's decision in Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), however, an accused has constitutional standing to challenge
electronic surveillance only if it extends to his conversations or conversation on his
premises. Thus, the ABA analogously requires disclosure of the electronic surveillance of
only those "conversations to which the accused was a party or of his premises." ABA
DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 2.1(b)(iii).
65. 224 Pa. Super. 280, 303 A.2d 519 (1973).
66. Id. at 284, 303 A.2d at 521.
67. Id. at 285, 303 A.2d at 522.
68. See ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 2.1, Comment at 56-57 (requir-
ing disclosure of the names and addresses of all witnesses the prosecutor intends to call at
the hearing or trial to facilitate plea discussions and defense preparation for cross-examina-
tion).
69. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2). "The requirement of reasonableness will permit the
court to define and limit the scope of the government's obligation to search its files while
meeting the legitimate needs of the defendant." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b) (Advisory Commit-
tee Notes to the 1966 Amendment, 1975). For a discussion of materiality to the preparation
of the case, see notes 126-29 and accompanying text infra.
70. ABA Standards do not require prosecutorial disclosure of rebuttal witnesses
before trial. "However, the prosecuting attorney should not be tempted to use this mecha-
nism to avoid disclosing a witness whose testimony is actually and realistically a part of his
case in chief." ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 2.1, Comment at 58.
2. Identity of Defense Witnesses .- In addition to sanctioning dis-
cretionary disclosure of prosecution witnesses, rule 305 compels defense
counsel to supply the district attorney with the names and addresses of all
witnesses the defense intends to call in support of an alibi defense71 or a
mental incompetency or insanity defense. 72 To avoid the due process
problems inherent to such a requirement 73 a reciprocal duty is imposed
on the prosecutor to "disclose to the defendant the names and addresses
of all persons the Commonwealth intends to call as witnesses to disprove
or discredit the defendant's claim of alibi or of insanity or mental
infirmity." 74 This requirement of reciprocal disclosure implements the
policy that "disclosures between the defense and the prosecution should
be 'full and free' and a 'two-way street' as much as possible."
75
3. Statements of Prosecution Witnesses .- Before the adoption of
rule 305, the disposition of a request for the statement of a prosecution
witness depended upon when the request was made. If the request was
made after the witness had already testified, the right to disclosure was
constitutionally guaranteed. 76 The grant of a pretrial request for dis-
covery, however, was prohibited.
77
(a) Requests for discovery during trial.-In Commonwealth v.
Smith,78 Justice Musmanno declared that due process requires prosecu-
torial production of the previous statements of those who speak against
the accused.
The most elementary principles of what is deemed rea-
sonable and right dictate that [defendant] be allowed to see
what witnesses have previously said to the government about
him when they testify against him in court. It is simply unthink-
able that in a government of the people, the government should
71. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(l)(a).
72. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(l)(b).
73. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). "[T]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights
are given to criminal defendants." Id. at.472. See also Commonwealth v. Contakos, 455 Pa.
136, 314 A.2d 259 (1974) (Pennsylvania rule 312 suffered from the same constitutional
infirmity as Oregon's alibi rule and was, therefore, suspended).
74. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(1)(c).
75. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, Proposed Provision § 3.3, Comment at
3.
76. The principle that a criminal defendant enjoyed a right to discover prior state-
ments of prosecution witnesses at trial originated in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
668 (1957). Pennsylvania adopted the principle as an aspect of due process. In re Schlesin-
ger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961). Thereafter the Supreme Court clarified that "our
holding in Jencks was not put on constitutional grounds, for it did not have to be; but it
would be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface of
the decision." Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362, 363 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). The principle was retained nevertheless by Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v.
Smith, 417 Pa. 321, 332, 208 A.2d 219, 225 (1965). See notes 78-84 and accompanying text
infra.
77. "In no event, however, shall the court order pretrial discovery or inspection of
written statements of witnesses in the possession of the Commonwealth." PA. R. CRIM. P.
310. See notes 85-88 and accompanying text infra.
78. 417 Pa. 321, 208 A.2d 219 (1965).
withhold from one of the people evidence which could prove
him innocent of a crime against all of the people.79
Nonetheless, the due process right to the prior statements of prosecution
witnesses who have testified at trial is not automatic.
Before defense counsel can discover the prior statements of prosecu-
tion witnesses, he must make a timely 80 and specific"' request. Moreover,
not every utterance can be elevated to the status of a "statement" for
purposes of discovery.
The distinction between a report that is a verbatim, signed,
or adopted recordation of a witness' statement and an imprecise
summary of what another understood him to say has been
recognized in both federal and state cases. . . .The rationale
behind this distinction is that it is unfair to allow the defense to
use statements to impeach a witness which cannot fairly be said
to be the witness' own rather than the product of the inves-
tigator's selection, interpretation and recollection.82
Under this standard, the grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses
83
and investigative reports containing the statements of prosecution wit-
nesses84 could be discovered.
(b) Pretrial requests for discovery.-In Commonwealth v. Kontos,85
the supreme court observed that the rationale underlying the prohibition
by rule 310 against the pretrial production of witness statements is
inapposite to the trial situation. "Once the Commonwealth's witnesses
have appeared at trial, their personal safety and freedom from potential
intimidation are in no way enhanced by denying to the defendant access
to their pretrial statements. Nor would the granting of such access to the
defendant heighten his opportunity for successful perjury."86 Notwith-
79. Id. at 332, 208 A.2d at 225.
80. The preferred time to request discovery at trial of a witness' statement is im-
mediately after he testifies on direct, see Commonwealth v. Robinson, 229 Pa. Super. Ct.
131, 136, 324 A.2d 441, 444 (1974), but a request may be considered timely if made at any
time when the statement will be useful to the defense for cross-examination, see In re
Cowell, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 187, 364 A.2d 718, 723 (1976). A pretrial request is not
sufficient, but must be renewed at trial. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 457 Pa. 554, 561,
327 A.2d 632, 636 (1974).
81. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 136, 324 A.2d 441, 444
(1974). The request, as a trial matter, need not be in writing. See Commonwealth v. Walak,
228 Pa. Super. Ct. 404, 406, 323 A.2d 886, 888 (1974).
82. Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 153, 369 A.2d 1234, 1240 (1977). This
distinction is relevant if the statement is used for impeachment, but makes little sense as a
limitation on discovery. Even imprecise summaries may lead defense investigators to new
evidence. Concern for a fair cross-examination should affect the use of witness summaries
at trial rather than their discoverability. See ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, §
2.1, Comment at 61-64.
83. Commonwealth v. Columbia Inv. Corp., 457 Pa. 353, 325 A.2d 289 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Kelly, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 369 A.2d 438 (1976).
84. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 477, 362 A.2d 1041 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 324 A.2d 441 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Allen, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 403, 289 A.2d 476 (1972); Commonwealth v. Swierczewski, 215 Pa.
Super. Ct. 130, 257 A.2d 336 (1969) (statement of police officer). Problems of comity may
arise when a federal agency refuses to disclose such reports. See Commonwealth v.
Smythe, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 369 A.2d 300 (1976).
85. 442 Pa. 343, 276 A.2d 830 (1971).
86. Id. at 349, 276 A.2d at 833.
standing the dangers of witness intimidation and perjury, the ABA has
argued convincingly that the majority rule 87 prohibiting pretrial produc-
tion of witness statements is unfounded. First, fairness requires that these
statements be produced during the criminal prosecution. Second, pretrial
disclosure will avoid the delays caused by disclosure during trial. Third,
pretrial production permits adequate preparation and minimizes surprise.
Last, the trial court can issue a protective order when the dangers of
perjury and intimidation become real.8"
(c) The compromise of rule 305.-Rule 305 represents an attempt to
reconcile the defense interest in adequate preparation with the Common-
wealth's interest in protecting its witnesses and preventing perjury. The
new rule authorizes the discretionary8 9 pretrial discovery of
(b) all written or recorded statements, and substantially
verbatim oral statements, of eyewitnesses the Commonwealth
intends to call at trial;
(c) all written or recorded statements, and substantially
verbatim oral statements, made by co-defendants, and by co-
conspirators or accomplices, whether such individuals have
been charged or not . . ..
Moreover, the new rule permits pretrial disclosure of the statements of
other prosecution witnesses upon the showing that such discovery is "in
the interests of justice." 91 It is unclear, however, whether the permitted
discovery of "substantially verbatim oral statements" necessarily ex-
cludes nonverbatim summaries of a prospective witness' statements to a
police officer. 92 Who can be classified as a co-defendant, co-conspirator,
or accomplice is also unclear, since rule 305 rejects the ordinary defini-
tions of those terms and provides that individuals need not be charged to
be so classified. 93 Notwithstanding these deficiencies,, rule 305 estab-
lishes means by which defense counsel can seek pretrial disclosure of
needed statements while allowing the court to deny discovery when
dangers of perjury or intimidation arise. Moreover, the defendant does
not lose his right to discovery at trial merely because the court exercised
its discretion to deny pretrial discovery of witness' statements.94
G. Pretrial Disclosure of Scientific Evidence
The importance of pretrial discovery to adequate defense preparation
is most apparent in cases in which the prosecution intends to introduce
scientific evidence. Thus, before the adoption of rule 310, Pennsylvania
courts allowed pretrial disclosure of such evidence "in appropriate cir-
87. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 181, 263-66 (1966).
88. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 2.1, Comment at 57-58.
89. See note 69 supra.
90. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(b), (c) (emphasis added).
91. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(d).
92. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
93. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(c); see note 90 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 78-85 and accompanying text supra.
cumstances." 95 The rationale was fairness: "If. .. the prosecution will
offer expert testimony . . .defendant is entitled to meet it, if he can,
with expert rebuttal testimony. Such testimony could only be obtained if
the defendant's expert had the opportunity to examine and test the
articles.''
96
The "exceptional circumstances" requirement of rule 310, how-
ever, precluded pretrial discovery of scientific evidence in Pennsylvania.
Courts construed the need to obtain expert rebuttal testimony as ordinary
if the prosecution intended to introduce expert witnesses; therefore, the
very basis for the need prevented its fulfillment, because the need was not
extraordinary in the context of expert debate.97 Though at-trial discovery
was substituted for the pretrial discovery made unavailable by rule 310,98
it left the defense with two inadequate alternatives. First, defense counsel
could seek a continuance to obtain expert evaluation of the scientific
evidence, which unnecessarily interrupted and delayed the trial. Second,
the defense counsel could place its expert on the stand to make an
extemporaneous evaluation, which necessarily prevented fair expert de-
bate. 99
Rule 305 remedies these inadequacies by requiring the pretrial dis-
closure of "results or reports of scientific tests, expert opinions, and
written or recorded reports of polygraph examinations or other physical or
mental examinations of the defendant, which are within the possession or
control of the attorney for the Commonwealth. . . . " I0I Thus, absent a
protective order,1"' the Commonwealth must disclose all scientific evi-
dence "material to the instant case."
102
By seeking pretrial disclosure of the Commonwealth's scientific
95. Commonwealth v. Brown, 47 Del. 120, 121, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 196, 197 (Pa. C.P.
1959).
96. Id. at 121, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d at 197. See also In re DiJoseph, 394 Pa. 19, 25, 145
A.2d 187, 189 (1958) (Musmanno, J., concurring). See also Commonwealth v. Capps, 382
Pa. 72, 114 A.2d 338 (1955); Commonwealth v. Honeywell, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 491 (C.P. Luz.
1963).
97. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex ref. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 320 A.2d 134
(1974).
98. Commonwealth v. Hrynkow, 457 Pa. 529, 330 A.2d 858 (1974) (at-trial disclosure
of lab reports on defendant's clothing required); Commonwealth v. Stafford, 450 Pa. 252,
299 A.2d 590 (1973) (at-trial disclosure of lab reports on defendant's clothing required).
99. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 110, 320 A.2d 134, 138
(1974) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
100. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l)(e). The inclusion of polygraph results among the items
that must be disclosed indicates that test results need not be admissible to be discoverable,
since polygraph results are inadmissible in Pennsylvania criminal trials. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d 732 (1973). Other jurisdictions deny discovery of
polygraph results because they arc inadmissible. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64
Cal. 2d 159,410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966) (court also notes that results would not aid
defense preparation for trial); Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1970) (polygraph
results nondiscoverable because inadmissible). Notwithstanding their inadmissibility, polyg-
raph results provide the defense with insight into how the prosecutor approaches the case,
and answers made during polygraph examinations are prior statements. Zupp v. State, 258
Ind. 625, 632, 283 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1972) (DeBruler, J., concurring).
101. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305F.
102. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l). See notes 118-25 and accompanying text infra.
evidence, however, the defense opens the door for a prosecution request
for reciprocal disclosure. Upon the showing of materiality and rea-
sonableness, 10 3 a trial court may order the defense to disclose scientific
evidence that "the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief, or
[scientific evidence] prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to
call at the trial, when [the scientific evidence relates] to the testimony of
that witness .... "104 Pretrial exchange of scientific evidence can only
enhance the chances for fair expert debate at trial and could even save
money if the experts confine their arguments to a single set of results
equally accessible to both sides. 1
05
H. Pretrial Disclosure of Tangible Evidence
Both before' 0 6 and after 0 7 the adoption of rule 310, pretrial disclo-
sure of tangible evidence was rare. Rule 305, however, compels prosecu-
torial production of "any tangible objects, including documents, photo-
graphs, fingerprints, or other tangible evidence .... "108 This require-
ment surpasses the standard suggested by the ABA, which limits pretrial
discovery to only those tangible objects "which the prosecuting attorney
intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or
belong to the accused . . . . 19
The ABA's limitation on the pretrial production of tangible objects
is unnecessary. As the ABA itself recognizes,
[Plermitting defense counsel to inspect [physical objects] be-
103. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(2).
104. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(2)(a). Rule 305 requires the defendant to disclose the results
of all physical and mental examinations, but requires the prosecution to disclose only the
results of defendant's physical and mental examinations, and thus might be constitutionally
defective. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); notes 135-37 and accompanying text
infra.
105. State laboratory facilities are available to the defense in Idaho. See State v.
Bailey, 94 Idaho 285, 486 P.2d 998 (1971); IDAHO CODE § 19-861 (1948).
106. Before the adoption of rule 310, most courts denied pretrial discovery of tangible
evidence, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Graham, 42 Del. 313 (Pa. C.P. 1955) (denying pretrial
discovery of physical evidence), though discovery was occasionally allowed "in appropriate
circumstances." Commonwealth v. Hoban, 54 Lack. 213 (Pa. C.P. 1952) (denying pretrial
discovery of weapons). See also In re DiJoseph, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958) (permitting
discovery of weapons and other seized articles when Commonwealth had hampered defend-
ant's investigation); Commonwealth v. Brown, 47 Del. 120 (Pa. C.P. 1959) (permitting
discovery for independent expert evaluation).
107. After the adoption of rule 310, most defendants failed to demonstrate the "excep-
tional circumstances and compelling reasons" necessary for pretrial production of tangible
evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, 465 Pa. 134,348 A.2d 391 (1975) (defendant's
untutored nature is not an exceptional circumstance requiring disclosure of fingerprints);
Commonwealth v. Mervin, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 552, 326 A.2d 602 (1974) (denying disclosure
of physical evidence concerning the arrest).
108. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l)(f).
109. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 2.1(a)(v). The ABA expresses
concern over the defendant's property interest in the item held by the prosecution.
Required disclosure of items taken from the accused or over which he may have a
propriety interest (whether or not the prosecution intends to introduce them into
evidence) will facilitate decisions as to the legality of their seizure and their use as
leads. It will also be fundamental fairness to the man from whom they have been
taken, whose counsel may be able to make use of them in his defense.
Id., Comment at 68.
fore trial will be the only way to satisfy many of the objectives
to be achieved in the pretrial period, such as facilitating pleas,
insuring adequacy of preparation, including examination by
experts, and saving considerable time at any trial that follows.
Since the nature of the evidence is such that it is immutable,
many of the arguments frequently made against pretrial disclo-
sure do not apply."'
Thus, the new requirement of the pretrial production of tangible evidence
cannot be criticized merely because it is expansive. Nor can rule 305 be
criticized because it fails to provide for reciprocal discovery of tangible
evidence in the defendant's possession. Though facially this may seem
unfair, the availability to the prosecution of search warrants and inves-
tigative agencies must also be weighed in the balance.
I. Miscellaneous Discretionary Disclosure
If the defense identifies the evidence sought and can "establish that
its disclosure is in the interests of justice," '1 1 the trial court, under rule
305, may order discovery of such information, even if it is not includible
in any specified category. The specifically enumerated categories of
discoverable material are not, therefore, exhaustive. Rather, the rule
grants the judiciary flexibility to meet unusual or changing discovery
needs.
IV. Rule 305: Definitional and Constitutional Problems
By enumerating categories of discoverable material, defining the
terms upon which discovery may be ordered, and presenting guidelines
for the trial court's exercise of its discretion,112 rule 305 substantially
improves pretrial discovery in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, the rule is far
from perfect; it presents both definitional" 13 and constitutional" 4 difficul-
ties.
A. Definitional Problems
Although rule 305 limits the court's exercise of discretion, unclear
discovery standards dilute this effect. Rule 305 does not define what
constitutes material, and therefore discoverable, evidence." 5 Moreover,
it countenances the grant of a protective order against discovery upon a
"sufficient showing" with no enumeration of what matters a court may
consider in determining whether such a showing has been made.'
1 6
1. Requirement that Discoverable Items be Material.-All dis-
110. Id.
I11. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(d).
112. The official comment following rule 305 incorporates ABA DISCOVERY STAN-
DARDS, supra note 4, § 1.1, 1.2.
113. See notes 115-31 and accompanying text infra.
114. See notes 132-45 and accompanying text infra.
115. See notes 117-29 and accompanying text infra.
116. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305F. See notes 130-31 and accompanying text infra.
coverable items requested under the provisions of rule 305 must be
material. "17 The rule fails, however, to define the word "material" and,
thus, may lead to unnecessary litigation.
(a) Mandatory discovery: "material to the instant case. "--To obtain
disclosure under the mandatory discovery provisions of rule 305, a party
must make an initial showing that the items requested are "material to the
instant case."1 8 This language may be construed either liberally or in its
strict evidentiary sense.
If construed in a strict evidentiary sense requiring admissibility
before an item is considered material,'t 9 the term "material to the instant
case" contradicts two other provisions of rule 305 that compel pretrial
discovery of polygraph examinations' 20 and electronic surveillance
recordings' 21 regardless of inadmissibility. 122 Moreover, it is often im-
possible to make a pretrial determination whether the foundation neces-
sary for admission can be laid.' 23
Liberal interpretation of the phrase "material to the instant case"
insures full and free discovery, 24 a policy first acknowledged in the
context of criminal procedure by Chief Justice Marshall, who ordered the
disclosure to defendant Aaron Burr of the contents of a disputed letter:
Let it be supposed that the letter may not contain anything
respecting the person now before the court. Still it may respect
a witness material to the case, and become important by bearing
on his testimony. Different representations may have been
made by that witness, or his conduct may have been such as to
affect his testimony. In various modes a paper may bear upon
the case, although before the case is opened its particular appli-
cation cannot be perceived by the judge.'25
A narrow construction of the word "material" would only thwart the
search for truth.
(b) Discretionary discovery: material to the preparation of the case.-
117. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1), (2) & C(2).
118. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l).
119. Pennsylvania appellate courts have rarely had occasion to interpret the word
"material," see, e.g., Sherwood Bros. v. Yellow Cab Co., 283 Pa. 488, 129 A. 563 (1925),
and have never done so in a pretrial discovery context. In other jurisdictions, however,
courts have refused to permit the discovery of items that would later be inadmissible. See
note 101 supra.
120. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(l)(e).
121. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B()(g).
122. See notes 53-55 and 100 supra.
123. Commonwealth v. Hamm, - Pa. -, 378 A.2d 1219 (1977). "We do not believe
that the trial court can determine the value that prior statements may have to the defense
without hearing defense argument after inspection." Id. at -, 378 A.2d at 1225 (emphasis
added). Accord, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969); Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957). Seealso
note 125 and accompanying text infra.
124. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, note 4 supra, § 1.2 (incorporated in rule 305); Giles
v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
125. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (1807), quoted with approval in
Commonwealth v. Smith, 417 Pa. 321, 334 n.5, 208 A.2d 219, 226 n.4 (1965).
The discretionary provisions of rule 305 permit discovery if the items
requested are material to the preparation of the case. 126 On its face, this
standard is broader than a restriction of pretrial discovery to those items
"material to the instant case." Despite this apparent breadth, the Fifth
Circuit has interpreted an identical provision in the federal discovery
rules' 27 to require "some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the
disputed evidence would have enabled the defendant significantly to alter
the quantum of evidence in his favor."' 128 Such an approach, however,
requires the use of hindsight129 and, therefore, provides an inadequate
standard for pretrial discovery determinations.
2. Protective Orders Based upon a "Sufficient Showing".-The
second principal uncertainty of rule 305 is its failure to define the
requisite "sufficient showing" for a protective order.' 30 Since protective
orders can deny, restrict, or defer mandatory as well as discretionary




Once the courts have hurdled the definitional problems of rule 305,
they must confront several constitutional questions. Does the failure of
rule 305 to require strict reciprocity in the exchange of scientific evidence
violate the defendant's right to due process? 32 Does the notice-of-alibi
requirement invade an accused's privilege against self-incrimination?
33
Do sanctions for noncompliance with rule 305 violate the defendant's
right to compulsory process?' 14
1. Reciprocity and Due Process.-Rule 305 requires prosecu-
torial disclosure of the results of physical and mental examinations
performed upon the defendant.I35 The defendant who exercises this right,
however, may be compelled to provide the district attorney with the
126. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2) (disclosure by the prosecution); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(2)
(disclosure by the defense).
127. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C), (D).
128. United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1975).
129. The ABA rejected the "material to the preparation of the defense" standard,
because
First, if the test were construed so that inspection of anything the prosecution
intends to introduce is always regarded as material to preparation of the defense, it
would be an unnecessary encumbrance on the smooth operation of criminal proce-
dures. Second, were it not so liberally construed, it would be nearly impossible of
satisfaction without there first being the opportunity to inspect the items.
ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, note 4 supra, § 2.1, Comment at 68.
130. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305F.
131. Rule 305F, however, does create a mechanism for appeal of protective-order
decisions. Thus, the appellate.courts will have an opportunity to define the concept of
"sufficient showing."
132. See notes 135-37 and accompanying text infra.
133. See notes 138.41 and accompanying text infra.
134. See notes 14245 and accompanying text infra.
135. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(2)(a).
results of all physical and mental examinations he intends to produce at
trial.136 Although this reciprocity requirement would appear to conflict
with due process, 137 the problem is probably more semantic than constitu-
tional. Since examination results are necessarily part of an expert opin-
ion, rule 305 entitles the defendant to discover the results of examinations
of others as "expert opinions" in the possession of the prosecutor.
2. Notice-of-Alibi and the Fifth Amendment.-Less semantic than
the reciprocity problem, however, is the question of self-incrimination
raised by the notice-of-alibi provision. 138 Rule 305 permits the impeach-
ment of a defendant with his own notice-of-alibi if he "testifies concern-
ing his presence at the time of the offense at a place or time different from
that specified in the notice ..... " 139 Such a provision conflicts with the
traditional justification offered for notice-of-alibi rules,140 may compel
the defendant to impeach himself, and, therefore, might not withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 141
3. Right to Compulsory Process.-Exclusion of material and ex-
culpatory evidence that the defendant did not disclose as required by rule
305 142 seriously infringes on the sixth amendment right to compulsory
process.143 Though the Supreme Court has not yet ruled that an exclu-
sionary sanction is constitutionally impermissible,'" such a sanction can




Notwithstanding its definitional and constitutional inadequacies,
rule 305 improves the procedural system and increases fairness to the
criminally accused by defining the standards for and expanding the
availability of pretrial discovery. Liberal discovery, as implemented by
136. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(e).
137. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). "Although the Due Process Clause has
little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded . . . it
does speak to the balance of forces between the accused and his accuser." Id. at 474.
138. PA. R. CRiM. P. 305C(l).
139. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(l)(g).
140. "It simply requires [defendant] to disclose information that he will shortly reveal
anyway." Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 62, 372 P.2d 919, 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879,
882 (1962).
141. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(f) renders a withdrawn alibi inadmissible.
142. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305E (noncompliance in general); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(l)(d)
(noncompliance with notice of alibi and insanity defense provisions).
143. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (arbitrary exclusion of codefen-
dant as witness violated defendant's right to compulsory process when the codefendant was
capable of giving relevant and material testimony); Note, The Preclusion Sanction-A
Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342 (1972). But cf.
State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, -, 163 N.W.2d 177, 181-82 (1968) (distin-
guishing exclusion of alibi witnesses from exclusion of codefendants in Washington v.
Texas, supra).
144. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 n.14 (1970).
145. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS, note 4 supra, § 4.7, Comment at 107-08.
the rule, should facilitate plea bargaining, expose issues collateral to the
determination of guilt, avoid trial delay, and reduce the need for repeti-
tious trials. Although several questions remain unresolved, rule 305
finally expresses judicial recognition of the need for the free exchange of
information during the pretrial period as an aid to the conduct of a fair
trial by well-prepared contestants.
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